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INTRODUCTION 
Employees in the meat and poultry processing industry work under 
some of the most dangerous working conditions in the nation, yet they 
are undercompensated.1  The following excerpt demonstrates one task for 
which employees are commonly uncompensated entirely: the “donning 
and doffing” of safety equipment.2 
I would get my old stuff out, put my rubber boots on, and then you 
go form a line where they hand out your supplies and there’s somebody 
right there that’ll hand you a red smock or white smock depending on the 
department that you’re in, and then you step to the window and she 
hands you your plastic—the blue gloves, the plastic apron, a pair of ear 
plugs, and a hair net.  Or a cutting glove; you need to show a cuttin’ 
glove to get a cuttin’ glove.  It took 30 to 45 minutes a day just gettin’ 
ready to, ya know, the process of getting ready and finishin’ work.  You 
can’t walk outta there with blood up to your elbows, I’m not driving 
home like that. 
And you don’t get paid for that? 
No.3 
For years, courts have grappled with which activities at the 
beginning and end of the workday should be compensated.  Enacted in 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 See Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2003); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-96, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH: SAFETY IN THE 
MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY, WHILE IMPROVING, COULD BE FURTHER STRENGTHENED 
7, 18, 21, 27 (2005) [hereinafter WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH] (citing a 14.9% injury 
and illness rate in 2002 as compared to 7.2% for all of U.S. manufacturing from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is based on employer self-reporting); HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR: WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN U.S. MEAT AND POULTRY 
PLANTS (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/usa0105/2.htm#_ftnref20 
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH]; WILLIAM G. WHITTAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL 33002, LABOR PRACTICES IN THE MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW, 43–
47 (2005). 
 2 Hereinafter, the phrase “donning and doffing” refers to the putting on and taking 
off of safety equipment.  See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 369, 371 
(11th ed. 2008) (defining “doff” as “1 a : to remove (an article of wear) from the body  b 
: to take off (the hat) in greeting or as a sign of respect  2 : to rid oneself of : put aside . . . 
.”; defining “don” as “1 : to put on (an article of clothing)  2 : to wrap oneself in . . . .”); 
The Phrase Finder,  http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/doff-your-hat.html (last visited 
June 17, 2012) (noting that “don” and “doff” are contractions of “do on” and “do off” 
that originated in Northern England in the fifteenth century and have come to mean the 
putting on and taking off of clothing items or even personas or ideas; doffing was also 
associated with temporarily removing a hat or cap as a sign of respect). 
 3 DONALD D. STULL & MICHAEL J. BROADWAY, SLAUGHTERHOUSE BLUES: THE 
MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY IN NORTH AMERICA 77 (John A. Young ed., Wadsworth 
2004). 
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1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) prescribes a minimum 
wage per hour of work and overtime pay for workweeks in excess of 
forty hours.4  Ten years after the FLSA was enacted, in reaction to 
judicial interpretations that increased their liability under the statute, 
employers lobbied Congress to enact the Portal to Portal Act (“PPA”) to 
amend the FLSA.5  The PPA excludes certain types of activities 
performed at the start and end of the workday from remuneration.6  Just 
two years later, employers successfully lobbied for another amendment 
to the FLSA, which further limited their liability.7  This second 
amendment, Section 203(o), allowed employers and union 
representatives to bargain with respect to the time employees spend 
changing clothes and washing at the beginning and end of the workday. 8 
In light of the considerable amount of time employees spend 
donning and doffing safety equipment at the beginning and end of each 
workday, the PPA and Section 203(o) are at the heart of wage and hour 
litigation in the meat and poultry processing industry.  Regardless of 
whether employees work with large animals, such as cattle, sheep, or 
hogs, or with smaller animals, such as turkeys or chickens, the 
slaughtering and packing process entails regular contact with hazardous 
material such as blood, feces, intestinal juices, and poisonous chemicals 
necessitating sanitization.9  The process also requires the operation of 
hazardous tools and machinery to kill and dismantle animals, and further 
unsafe working conditions are created by continuous, repetitive motions 
of cutting in cramped workspaces at unsafe speeds.10  Therefore, 
                                                                                                                                     
 4 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1974); 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2007, 2010). 
 5 Daniel V. Dorris, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage-and-Hour 
Law Claims, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1256 (2009). 
 6 See 29 U.S.C. § 254 (1996); IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005); Dorris, 
supra note 5, at 1256 (noting that other noteworthy changes to the FLSA were a two year 
statute of limitations, which became three if the violation was in bad faith, 29 U.S.C. § 
255; the elimination of liquidated damages except for violations made in bad faith, 29 
U.S.C.A. § 260; and required opt-in for class action suits, 29 USC § 216(b).). 
 7 Anderson v. Cagle’s Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 958 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 95 CONG. 
REC. 11,433 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1949) (comments of Rep. Herter)). 
 8 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006).  Section 203(o) is within the “Definitions” section of 
the FLSA and provides: 
(o) Hours Worked.—In determining for the purposes of sections 206 and 207 of this title 
the hours for which an employee is employed, there shall be excluded any time spent in 
changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday which was 
excluded from measured working time during the week involved by the express terms of 
or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to 
the particular employee.  Id. 
 9 WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 44–45; WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 
1, at 20. 
 10 WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 19–24; WHITTAKER, supra note 
1, at 44 (describing health and safety concerns such as “workers ‘stationed so close 
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employees must wear protective gear, which varies in weight and 
complexity, according to the task.11  The more complicated the protective 
gear, the more time required to prepare for work, breaks, and cleaning.12 
To maximize profits in a competitive marketplace, employers 
typically utilize a “gang time” pay model and pay employees only for 
time spent on the production line actually processing meat or poultry.13  
Employees may spend as much as an hour each day donning and doffing 
safety equipment, yet are frequently not paid for this time.14  Since 
employers do not include the time spent donning and doffing as part of a 
forty-hour workweek, courts that have considered the issue, in some 
instances, have held such time to constitute overtime, requiring overtime 
pay.  But claims made on behalf of hundreds of employees can span 
several years and total millions of dollars in lost wages for workers and, 
conversely, liability for employers.15 
The Supreme Court has not yet interpreted Section 203(o).  Thus, 
circuits are split over what is covered by the provision, and only one 
circuit has ruled on whether it preempts more protective state laws.16  
Further, the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) has changed its 
position on the issue multiple times over the past fifteen years.17  The 
disagreement among the circuits primarily concerns the meaning of 
“clothing”—specifically, whether the various pieces of safety gear that 
employees are required to wear constitute clothing within the meaning of 
the statute.18  Employees argue that the term “clothing” does not include 
safety gear that is required to be worn by law, employers, or the nature of 
the work, and, therefore, parties are prohibited from bargaining over time 
                                                                                                                                     
together they lacerated coworkers with their knives, indicating a need for more space, 
more protective gear, or both.’”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 33; NEBRASKA 
APPLESEED, THE SPEED KILLS YOU: THE VOICE OF NEBRASKA’S MEATPACKING WORKERS 
27 (Oct. 2009) [hereinafter NEBRASKA APPLESEED], available at 
http://www.boldnebraska.org/uploaded/pdf/the_speed_kills_you_030910.pdf. 
 11 WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 44–45; WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 
1, at 25. 
 12 WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 44–45. 
 13 Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 899–900; Perez v. Mountaire Farms Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 360 
(4th Cir. 2011); CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., WORK WITHOUT 
JUSTICE: LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT LABORERS 22 (2000) [hereinafter WORK WITHOUT 
JUSTICE], available at http://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/atrisk3.pdf. 
 14 STULL & BROADWAY, supra note 3, at 77; Perez, 650 F.3d at 372; De Ascencio v. 
Tyson Food, Inc., 500 F.3d 361 (3d Cir. 2007); but see Townsend v. BC Natural Chicken 
LLC, No. 06-4317, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2007) (union 
employees bargained to be paid for a portion of the time spent donning and doffing). 
 15 See infra notes 33–41 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 146–50, 178–82 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 132–145 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 146–50 and accompanying text. 
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spent donning and doffing.19  In contrast, employers argue that clothing 
includes all safety gear that employees don and doff at the beginning and 
end of each workday, permitting parties to bargain over this time.20  
Furthermore, employees argue that Section 203(o) and the Labor 
Relations Management Act (“LMRA”) do not preempt state laws 
requiring payment for donning and doffing, whereas employers argue 
that Section 203(o) and the LMRA preempt state law.21 
This article presents two arguments.  First, Section 203(o) should 
be interpreted narrowly to exclude “required safety gear” in fairness to 
workers.22  The exploitative work conditions present in the meat and 
poultry processing industry demand more protective laws.23  
Compensating workers for time spent donning and doffing safety gear 
required to perform their work is consistent with the purpose of the 
FLSA, which is to combat exploitative working conditions through a 
minimum standard of living.24  Section 203(o) will not be rendered 
meaningless by preventing collective bargaining over the time spent 
donning and doffing required safety gear because time spent donning and 
doffing regular clothing can still be part of a collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA”).25 
Allowing CBAs to exclude time spent donning and doffing 
required safety gear runs counter to the purpose of FLSA.  When it 
excluded particular activities from compensation under the PPA, 
Congress wanted to ensure that the definition of work was not otherwise 
altered and, therefore, declared that the PPA should be construed 
liberally to encompass all work regardless of contract, custom, or 
practice.26  In interpreting the PPA, the Supreme Court has found that 
activities such as the donning and doffing of required safety gear are 
                                                                                                                                     
 19 Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894. 
 20 Spoerle v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 527 F. Supp.2d 860 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (employer did 
not dispute the time was work but argued it was excluded under Section 203(o) because 
safety gear constituted clothing). 
 21 See Anna Wermuth & Jeremy Glenn, It’s No Revolution: Long Standing Legal 
Principles Mandate the Preemption of State Laws in Conflict with Section 3(o) of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 839 (2010). 
 22 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) & n.65 (1970) (noting that safety gear should be excluded if 
“required by law, by rules of the employer, or by the nature of the work,” but not gear 
worn primarily for the employee’s convenience.). 
 23 See infra Part II. 
 24 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1974) (describing the congressional finding and declaration of 
policy of the FLSA). 
 25 Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2001) (police officer 
uniforms); Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202 (7th Cir. 2008) (postal worker 
uniform); 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) (1970). 
 26 See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
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work that must be compensated.27  Furthermore, because Section 203(o) 
is an FLSA exemption, it commands a narrow interpretation.  Safety gear 
does not plainly and unmistakably fit within the clothing exemption. 
Secondly, this article argues that both Section 203(o) and the 
LMRA should not preempt more protective state laws.  Apart from 
whether required safety gear is found to constitute “clothing” under 
Section 203(o), states should be permitted to promulgate more protective 
legislation.  The FLSA’s “Savings Clause” expressly permits states to set 
a higher minimum wage and shorter maximum workweek.28  
Compensating employees for time spent donning and doffing safety gear 
shortens the workweek and falls within the Savings Clause. 
The LMRA, which governs preemption, yields to the FLSA’s 
provisions on the minimum wage and maximum workweek, prohibiting 
employers and union representatives from bargaining for payment below 
the minimum wage or for a workweek longer than the maximum set by 
federal or state law.29  Activities not covered under the PPA, such as time 
spent donning and doffing required safety gear, contribute to the 
maximum workweek.30  Since the LMRA yields to laws setting a shorter 
workweek, the LMRA should not preempt state laws providing for 
shorter workweeks by requiring payment of time spent donning and 
doffing. 
This article will proceed as follows.  Part II summarizes the 
conditions employees face in the meat and poultry processing industry, 
all of which evidence the need for more protective labor laws and greater 
enforcement.  Part III establishes a background of the relevant law, 
providing a review of the FLSA, the PPA, Section 203(o), and 
corresponding case law.  It also evaluates the preemption of state law 
with respect to Section 203(o) and the LMRA.  Part IV then provides an 
analysis, arguing that the PPA, other laws, and canons of interpretation 
support the exclusion of time spent donning and doffing required safety 
gear within Section 203(o) and thus preclude the bargaining of this time.  
Apart from whether time spent donning and doffing required safety gear 
is precluded from Section 203(o), Part IV argues that the FLSA’s 
Savings Clause prevents more protective state laws from being 
preempted by Section 203(o).31  Finally, Part IV argues that since the 
                                                                                                                                     
 27 29 U.S.C. § 254 (1996); IBP, Inc.v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005); Steiner v. 
Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956). 
 28 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1967). 
 29 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740–41 (1981); 
Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 30 29 U.S.C. § 254 (d) (1996). 
 31 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1967). 
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time spent donning and doffing required safety gear counts toward the 
maximum workweek,32 the LMRA should not preempt state laws 
requiring a shorter workweek. 
WORK CONDITIONS IN THE MEAT AND POULTRY PROCESSING INDUSTRY 
Over the past ten years, there have been numerous books, reports, 
and films documenting a number of serious issues within the United 
States meat and poultry processing industry, including lethal food 
contamination, extraordinarily high injury and death rates for workers, 
meager salaries, inadequate compensation for work injuries, and the 
negative economic and environmental impact on communities where 
factories are located. 33  Despite these numerous reports detailing the 
dangers and abuses within the industry, workers continue to struggle for 
safe working conditions and decent pay.34  Although several legislative 
regimes are available to protect employees from violations of safety, 
labor, and other laws, there is widespread under-enforcement, especially 
when it comes to the most vulnerable and lowest wage earners.35  Even 
                                                                                                                                     
 32 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2010) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, no 
employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours 
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess.”). 
 33 See ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN 
MEAL 149–223 (Harper Perennial 2005) (2001); FAST FOOD NATION (20th Century Fox 
2007); FOOD, INC. (Magnolia Home Entertainment 2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra 
note 1; WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 1; WHITTAKER, supra note 1; 
NEBRASKA APPLESEED, supra note 10; STULL & BROADWAY, supra note 3; A RIVER OF 
WASTE: THE HAZARDOUS TRUTH ABOUT FACTORY FARMS (Cinema Libre 2009); 
JONATHAN SAFRAN FOER, EATING ANIMALS (Hachette Book Grp., Inc. 2009); WORK 
WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 13; Charlotte S. Alexander, The Law and Economics of 
Peripheral Labor: A Poultry Industry Case Study, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
 34 See sources cited supra note 33. 
 35 WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 43–44 (referring to the DOL survey conducted in 
1997-1998, “Violations of the FLSA and of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 
Workers Protection Act were found to be systemic.  Some 60% of surveyed plants ‘had 
violations of wage and hour and safety and health laws.’”); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
POULTRY PROCESSING COMPLIANCE SURVEY FACT SHEET (2001), available at 
http://www.ufcw.org/docUploads/Usdept~1.pdf?CFID=7005606&CFTOKEN=63042914 
(finding wage and hour violations in 100% of the 51 companies inspected, 65% were 
misclassifying workers as exempt from FLSA coverage, 0% were in compliance with 
three major labor statutes,); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Labor Department 
Resolves Back Wage Case Against Pittsburg, Texas-Based Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. (Jan. 
29, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/whd20100073.htm; 
Brady & Associates, Tyson Pays $32 Million to Settle Donning and Doffing Lawsuit, 
KANSAS CITY EMPLOYMENT LAWYER BLOG (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://www.kansascityemploymentlawyerblog.com; J.C. Solomon, Jury Awards $2 
Million Verdict to Meat Processing Facility Employees, WAGE & HOUR LAW BLOG (Sept. 
27, 2011), http://wageandhour.yezbaklaw.com; Cam Caldwell, Tyson Foods Workers 
Awarded Jury Verdict in FLSA Lawsuit, WAGE & HOUR LAW BLOG (Mar. 18, 2011), 
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when employees manage to complain or unionize, under-protective and 
unpredictable laws do not provide meaningful solutions to correct the 
detrimental work conditions the FLSA was meant to address.36 
A prevalent problem within the meat and poultry processing 
industry is the systemic lack of enforcement of wage and hour laws.37  
Nationwide, it has been estimated that employers pay more than one 
billion dollars annually to litigate wage and hour cases.38  Wage and hour 
class action suits are the most common type of class action, account for 
almost 20% of all class actions.39  The meat and poultry industry is 
responsible for a large share of these violations, which have persisted for 
many years.  Out of fifty-one poultry companies surveyed in 2000, the 
DOL found that 100% had wage and hour violations.40  Wage and hour 
violations continue to plague the industry as evidenced by recent wage 
and hour lawsuits on behalf of poultry and meat processing workers at 
Tyson Foods, Inc. and Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.41 
At one time, a job in the meatpacking industry was desirable 
because of gains made by strong union membership.42  Union 
membership in the meat processing industry was roughly 50% between 
1970 and 1980; however, by 1987, that percentage had declined to 
21%.43  Since then, union membership has remained around 20% for 
                                                                                                                                     
http://wageandhour.yezbaklaw.com/2011/09/articles/meat-and-poultry-workers/jury-
awards-2-million-verdict-to-meat-processing-facility-employees/. 
 36 See sources cited supra note 35; Benjamin, I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making 
Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1162–64 (2011); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 3–5; WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 
7; WORK WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 26; WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 7; 
Alexander, supra note 33. 
 37 See sources cited supra notes 33 and 35. 
 38 See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: 
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES (2009), available at 
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1; Shannon 
Green, Wage and Hour Litigation is Big—and Getting Bigger, N.J. LAW JOURNAL, Mar. 
19, 2012, available at, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nj/PubArticleNJ.jsp?id=1202546026856&slreturn=1; Dorris 
supra note 5, at 1255 (“The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor 
recovered over $ 185 million in unpaid wages for more than 228,000 employees in fiscal 
year 2008.  This is just a small percentage of the probable number of FLSA violations.  
Private actions likely recovered many times more unpaid wages during the same time 
period. One report suggests private plaintiffs recover over $ 1 billion annually.”); 
Michael Orey, Wage Wars, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 1, 2007, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_40/b4052001.htm. 
 39 Dorris supra note 5, at 1251. 
 40 See sources cited supra note 35; WORK WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 12, 22. 
 41 See sources cited supra note 35. 
 42 WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 7; WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 
7; SCHLOSSER, supra note 33, at 149; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 11–16. 
 43 WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 7. 
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both poultry and meat workers, yet it still exceeds the average rate of 
union membership nationwide: 12%.44  This decline in union 
membership has coincided with the restructuring and consolidation of the 
industry (including relocation to union-free environments), a significant 
decrease in salaries, an increase in immigrant workers, and a large 
increase in employee turnover rate.45  Thus, while union membership in 
the meat and poultry industry is greater than the national average, 
members constitute only approximately 20% of the workforce and face 
multiple challenges in increasing their numbers to improve the abusive 
work conditions facing both nonunion and union employees. 
Although in many circumstances unions provide members with 
better work conditions than their nonunion counterparts, all employees 
still require baseline protection.  Within the meat and poultry processing 
industry, two barriers prevent unions from making meaningful 
improvements.  First, the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 
which governs unions, is under-protective and does not permit 
employees to effectively organize to protect their rights and improve 
working conditions.46  Second, fierce competition within the industry 
encourages employers to preserve abusive work practices in order to 
                                                                                                                                     
 44 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL 
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2010–11 LIBRARY EDITION, BULLETIN 2800, at 730 (U.S. Gov’t 
Printing Office 2010–11 ed. 2010) (citing 16% union coverage for food processing 
employees in 2008); Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, UNION MEMBERSHIP AND 
COVERAGE DATABASE FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS), 
http://unionstats.gsu.edu (last updated Feb. 4, 2012) (listing 20.3% union coverage for 
employees in the Animal Slaughtering and Processing Industry category (CIC 1180) and 
23.3% union coverage for employees in the Butchers and Meat, Fish, and Poultry 
Processing Occupation category (COC 7810)); Tony Horwitz, 9 To Nowhere—These Six 
Growth Jobs Are Dull, Dead-End, Sometimes Dangerous, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1994, at 
A6 (“Roughly 80% [of poultry workers] are nonunion . . . .”); Press Release, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members Summary–2011 (Jan. 27, 2012), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (citing 11.8% average for 
all union members, 37.0% for public sector, and 6.9% for private sector employees). 
 45 WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 7, 18; WHITTAKER, supra note 
1, at 25; STULL & BROADWAY, supra note 3, at 73–75; Alexander supra note 33; Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, May 2011 National Industry-Specific 
Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: NAICS 311600 - Animal Slaughtering 
and Processing, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_311600.htm (last modified Mar. 27, 2012) (listing 
annual mean wages of $23,610 for meat, poultry, and fish cutters and trimmers; $24,300 
for slaughterers and packers; and $27,410 for butchers and meat cutters in the animal 
slaughtering industry); David Moberg, Poultry Giants Fight Organizers, IN THESE TIMES, 
Jan. 30, 2004, available at 
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/689/poultry_giants_fight_organizers (noting that 
poultry workers make an average of $8 per hour). 
 46 Sachs, supra note 36, at 1162–64. 
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remain profitable.47  Therefore, stronger federal legislation and 
enforcement are required to ensure baseline protections, such as 
minimum wage and overtime pay, for union employees.48 
The labor law regime poses a formidable challenge to increasing 
union membership and strength, thus improving work conditions.  For 
years, U.S. labor law has been criticized as being ineffectual, and 
collective action has been described as “moribund.”49  Indeed, the NLRA 
has faced criticism over the same central issues, but repeated attempts at 
reform have failed.50  As an initial matter, the NLRA’s protection 
excludes many categories of employees.51  Under the NLRA, employers 
can easily interfere with employee organization, as unions lack the rights 
necessary to communicate with employees.52  Furthermore, the remedial 
framework of the NLRA is too weak to protect employees against 
retaliation from employers.53  The election process, for instance, is too 
slow, allowing employers to defeat unions through attrition and delay.54  
Finally, the NLRA’s “good faith” bargaining obligation is meaningless 
because the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) cannot impose 
contract terms as a remedy.55 
Although the NLRA granted workers the right to organize and 
bargain collectively in order to improve their working conditions, the 
FLSA’s purpose is to provide a “minimum standard of living necessary 
for health, efficiency, and general well-being” (through a minimum wage 
and maximum workweek)to address detrimental working conditions of 
workers.56  When legislative hearings on the proposal of the FLSA were 
held, Sydney Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
Union, urged that the only way to raise standards uniformly was to have 
it done by the government.57  Forcing high standards on only a few 
employers at a time would drive those employers out of business before 
the rest of the industry could effectively be organized.58 
                                                                                                                                     
 47 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 2. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Sachs, supra note 36, at 1162. 
 50 Id. at 1163–64. 
 51 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) (1978) (defining “employee”). 
 52 Sachs, supra note 36, at 1162. 
 53 Id. at 1162. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 1162–63. 
 56 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947); 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1974) (congressional finding and 
declaration of policy). 
 57 John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 468 (1939). 
 58 Id. at 468. 
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With union membership currently at approximately 20%, dramatic 
improvements with respect to wages or other work conditions are limited 
for union members.59  Human Rights Watch (“HRW”), which 
investigates and exposes human rights violations around the world, 
documented numerous violations by meat and poultry processing 
employers in a 185-page report entitled, “Blood, Sweat, and Fear: 
Workers’ Rights in U.S. Meat and Poultry Plants.”60  In its report, HRW 
calls upon the U.S. government to pass uniform legislation to strengthen 
minimum labor standards, arguing that if only one company attempted to 
improve workplace conditions, it likely would go bankrupt, as 
competitive companies would not follow suit.61  “Only governmental 
power can set a uniform floor of strengthened industry-wide rules” and 
“provide the strong legal enforcement required to deter employers from 
violating workers’ rights.”62 
BACKGROUND OF THE RELEVANT LAW 
A. Fair Labor Standards Act 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged Congress to pass the FLSA 
to give workers “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.”63  The President 
asserted the necessity for regulation of “maximum hours, minimum 
wages, the evil of child labor and the exploitation of unorganized 
labor.”64  The FLSA was enacted in 1938 to address the “existence . . . of 
labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard 
of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers.”65  These conditions, among other things, cause commerce “to 
be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions,” constitute “an 
unfair method of competition,” lead to labor disputes, and interfere “with 
the orderly and fair marketing of goods.”66  Thus, the primary purpose of 
the FLSA is to address employees’ living and working conditions,67 
                                                                                                                                     
 59 See Moberg, supra note 45. 
 60 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1. 
 61 Id. at 2. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Dorris, supra note 5, at 1253 (from public papers and addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt: the constitution prevails); see also Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 488 
F.3d 586, 589 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 64 Forsythe, supra note 57, at 465–66. 
 65 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1974) (congressional finding and declaration of policy). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Dorris, supra note 5, at 1253; Forsythe, supra note 57, at 465–66. 
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requiring employers to pay minimum wages and overtime.68  Congress 
declared that the FLSA was to be used “to correct and as rapidly as 
possible . . . eliminate these conditions without substantially curtailing 
employment or earning power,” and the Act has since been liberally 
interpreted.69 
B. The Portal to Portal Act 
In 1947, almost ten years after the passage of the FLSA, the PPA 
was enacted in response to lobbying efforts from employers to limit their 
FLSA liabilities.70  Several United States Supreme Court decisions 
prompted numerous lawsuits and subsequent lobbying for the passage of 
the PPA.71  “The primary concern was the many pending ‘portal-to-
portal’ suits—actions brought on the theory that travel time and other 
preliminary and postliminary work activities should be compensated.  
Nearly two thousand such suits had been filed in a six-month time span, 
resulting in well over $ 6 billion (in 1947 dollars) of estimated 
liability.”72 
An example of one such case is Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery 
Co.  There, employees were required to first punch a time clock and then 
walk to their respective work benches where they performed preliminary 
duties before beginning productive work.73  Employees were docked 
fourteen minutes for this activity at both the beginning and end of the 
workday, and at the start and end of lunchtime, which resulted in a fifty-
six-minute deduction from wages each day.74  The Supreme Court held 
that time spent walking from a time clock at the entrance of the factory to 
a workstation was part of the statutory workweek and must be 
compensated.75  The Court reasoned that an employer must compensate 
its employees for time it requires them to be on its work premises, on 
duty, or at a workplace prior and subsequent to the employees’ scheduled 
                                                                                                                                     
 68 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-7 (2007) (“Every employer shall pay to each of his employees . . 
. wages . . . not less than . . . $7.25 an hour.”); 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 (2010) (“[N]o employer 
shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless 
such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above 
specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is 
employed.”) 
 69 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1974); IBP, Inc.v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 25 (2005). 
 70 Dorris, supra note 5, at 1256. 
 71 See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 
(1944); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161 
(1945); Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). 
 72 Dorris, supra note 5, at 1256. 
 73 Anderson, 328 U.S. at 689–90. 
 74 Id. at 682–85. 
 75 Id. at 690–91. 
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working hours.76  In reaching this conclusion, the Court followed its 
recent decisions, including Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. 
Muscoda Local No. 123, where it held that time spent traveling from iron 
ore mine portals to underground work areas was compensable.77 
In enacting the PPA, Congress found that the FLSA had been 
judicially interpreted “in disregard of long-established customs, 
practices, and contracts between employers and employees.”78  Congress 
was concerned that this unexpected liability would result in financial ruin 
for employers.79  The PPA, therefore, excluded from FLSA coverage 
time employees spend “walking, riding, or traveling to and from the 
actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which 
such employee is employed to perform, and activities which are 
preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities.”80 
Congress was careful to ensure, however, that only activities 
specifically detailed under the PPA were excluded from the FLSA’s 
protection.  In discussing the PPA, Senator Cooper explained which 
actions were covered: “[T]he liberal construction of the terms ‘principal 
activity or activities’ urged by Congress, the President, and the Secretary 
of Labor . . . [provide] broad coverage under the F.L.S.A. and 
limit[]application of the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exemptions . . . to those 
employee activities ‘which in no way enter into the production of 
goods.’”81  Furthermore, upon approving the PPA, the President stated 
the following to Congress: 
[T]he legislative history of the Act shows that Congress intends that 
the words “principal activities” are to be construed liberally to include 
any work of consequence performed for the employer, no matter when 
                                                                                                                                     
 76 Id. at 691. 
 77 Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 
(1944) (defining work as physical or mental exertion controlled or required by the 
employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his 
business); Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 131 (1944) (noting that exertion is 
not necessary for an activity to constitute work under the FLSA and that an employer 
may hire a man to do nothing or to wait for something to happen). 
 78 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (1947).  But see Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 
450 U.S. 728, 741 (1981) 
(“The Fair Labor Standards Act was not designed to codify or perpetuate [industry] 
customs and contracts . . . . Congress intended, instead, to achieve a uniform national 
policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work or employment engaged in by 
employees covered by the Act.  Any custom or contract falling short of that basic policy, 
like an agreement to pay less than the minimum wage requirements, cannot be utilized to 
deprive employees of their statutory rights.”). 
 79 Id.; see also Dorris, supra note 5, at 1256. 
 80 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1)–(2) (1996). 
 81 Dunlop v. City Electric, 527 F.2d 394, 399 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added) 
(quoting comments of Senator Cooper during floor debates on the Portal-to-Portal Act). 
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the work is performed.  We should not lose sight of the important 
requirement under the Act that all “principal activities” must be paid for, 
regardless of contract, custom, or practice.  I am sure the courts will not 
permit employers to use artificial devices such as the shifting of work to 
the beginning or the end of the day to avoid liability under the law.82 
1. DOL Regulations Interpreting the PPA 
Soon after the PPA was enacted, the Secretary of Labor issued an 
interpretive bulletin discussing the Act.83  Although administrative 
regulations are not given final authority until courts review them, 
Congress showed its support for the interpretation put forward by the 
Secretary of Labor by enacting Section 16(c) shortly thereafter. 84  
Section 16(c) strengthened the force of the Secretary of Labor’s 
interpretation by providing “any order, regulation, or interpretation . . . 
shall remain in effect . . . except to the extent that any such order, 
regulation, interpretation, or agreement may be inconsistent with the 
provisions of [the FLSA].”85 
Although not explicitly addressed in the statute, Congress 
effectively overturned Anderson and Tennessee Coal.  The Secretary of 
Labor stated that time spent “traveling between the portal of the mine 
and the working face at the beginning and end of each workday” would 
not be compensated in the absence of a contract, custom, or practice.86  
The PPA provides that employers must pay employees where there is “an 
express provision of a . . . contract” or a “custom or practice” of 
compensating activities that would otherwise be excluded under the 
PPA.87 
The PPA did not otherwise change the purpose of the FLSA or its 
definition of work.88  It did not affect the computation of hours within a 
                                                                                                                                     
 82 Id. at 398–99 & n.6 (emphasis added); see also 29 U.S.C. § 254(b) (1996); 29 
C.F.R. § 790.8(b)(2) (1970) (“Such preparatory activities, which the Administrator has 
always regarded as work and as compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, remain 
so under the Portal Act, regardless of contrary custom or contract.”). 
 83 29 C.F.R. § 790.1 (1970) (Introductory Statement). 
 84 Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 255 (1956); 29 C.F.R. § 790.1(c) (1970); Brief 
for Respondents at 21 IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (No. 03-1238). 
 85 Steiner, 350 U.S. at 255 & n.8. 
 86 29 C.F.R. § 790.5(b)(1)–(2) (1970) (explaining effect of Portal-to-Portal Act on 
determination of hours worked). 
 87 29 U.S.C. § 254(b) (1996). 
 88 IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 28; 29 C.F.R. § 790.2 (1970) (“[T]he act makes no express 
change in the national policy, declared by Congress in section 2 of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, of eliminating labor conditions ‘detrimental to the maintenance of the 
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers.’ The legislative history indicates that the Portal Act was not intended to change 
this general policy.”). 
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workday, that is, the period between the commencement and conclusion 
of the principal work activities.89  The Secretary of Labor explained that 
“[p]reparatory activities, which the Administrator has always regarded as 
work and as compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, remain so 
under the Portal Act, regardless of contrary custom or contract.”90 
2. The PPA Case Law 
i. United States Supreme Court Law on the PPA 
Eight years after the PPA was enacted, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Steiner v. Mitchell, concluded that principal activities comprise 
all activities which are “an integral and indispensable part of the 
principal activities,” including the donning and doffing of protective gear 
“before or after the regular work shift, on or off the production line.”91  
Steiner involved a battery manufacturing plant where all production 
workers were exposed to corrosive and toxic chemicals.92  Workers were 
required to shower and change their clothes at the plant in order to 
protect their health and the health of their families.93  This practice was 
part of an industrial hygiene program, and Tennessee state law required 
the employer to provide facilities for showering and changing clothes.94  
In reaching its decision, the Court referred to a colloquy that took place 
during Senate hearings on the PPA, in which Senator Cooper had stated, 
“[I]f the employee could not perform his activity without putting on 
certain clothes, then the time used in changing into those clothes would 
be compensable as part of his principal activity.”95 
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, another significant Supreme Court decision, 
was a consolidation of two federal appellate cases involving employers 
in the meat and poultry processing industry.96  Alvarez v. IBP, Inc. 
                                                                                                                                     
 89 IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 28; 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a)–(b) (1970). 
 90 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a) (1970) (noting that an employee operating a lathe “will 
frequently at the commencement of his workday oil, grease or clean his machine, or 
install a new cutting tool,” and that “a garment worker in a textile mill, who is required to 
report 30 minutes before other employees report to commence their principal activities,” 
will “during such 30 minutes distribute[] clothing or parts of clothing at the workbenches 
of other employees and get[] machines” ready for use by other employees); 29 C.F.R. § 
790.7(a) (1970) (noting that “the criteria described in the Portal Act have no bearing on 
the compensability or the status as worktime under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
activities that are not ‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ activities outside the workday.”). 
 91 Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). 
 92 Id. at 249. 
 93 Id. at 251. 
 94 Id. at 250. 
 95 Id. at 258 (citation omitted). 
 96 IBP, Inc.v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 24 (2005). 
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involved a slaughter and processing plant belonging to the largest meat 
processor in the United States, at which all production workers were 
required to wear numerous articles of protective gear.97  The Ninth 
Circuit in Alvarez held that the donning and doffing of protective gear 
was integral and indispensible.98  It also held that time spent donning and 
doffing protective gear that was unique to the job at issue was 
compensable, but that time employees spent donning and doffing non-
unique protective gear was “de minimis as a matter of law” and not 
compensable.99  Tum v. Barber involved production workers in a poultry 
plant who were required to wear numerous articles of protective gear.100  
The First Circuit found that the employees’ donning and doffing was 
integral and indispensable, but that all time spent donning and doffing 
safety gear, and waiting and walking in association with donning and 
doffing, was de minimis and not compensable.101 
The principal question raised in both appellate cases was “whether 
postdonning and predoffing walking time [was] specifically excluded by 
[the PPA].”102  The Supreme Court held that 
any activity that is “integral and indispensable” to a “principal 
activity” is itself a “principal activity: under § 4(a) of the Portal-to-
Portal Act.  Moreover, during a continuous workday, any walking 
time that occurs after the beginning of the employee’s first principal 
activity and before the end of the employee’s last principal activity 
is excluded from the scope of that provision, and as a result is 
covered by the FLSA.103 
Thus, the Court ruled that the donning and doffing of safety gear 
was a principal activity.104  This principal activity, the court held, 
signaled the start and end of the workday, and time spent performing 
activities, including walking or waiting, conducted between the start and 
                                                                                                                                     
 97 Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 898 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 98 Id. at 903(recognizing the integral and indispensable standard set forth in Steiner). 
 99 Id.; see also Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding a 
distinction between unique and nonunique safety gear under Steiner’s integral and 
indispensable standard). 
 100 Tum v. Barber, 360 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and 
remanded sub nom. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005). 
 101 Id. at 279–81 
 102 IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 30 (2005). 
 103 Id. at 37. 
 104 Id.; Perez v. Mountaire Farms Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 368 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Although 
the parties in Alvarez did not challenge on appeal the conclusion that donning and doffing 
protective gear was integral and indispensable to the principal activity of poultry 
processing, it would be illogical to conclude that the Supreme Court would have held the 
walking time to be compensable if it entertained serious doubts regarding the 
compensability of the donning and doffing activities themselves.”). 
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end of the workday must be compensated.105  Although the circuits below 
found that, in some instances, time spent donning and doffing safety gear 
is de minimis and not compensable,106 the Court held that these particular 
instances of donning and doffing were still within the scope of “principal 
activity,” as they signaled the start and end of the workday.107 
ii. Circuit Law on the PPA 
In applying the “integral and indispensable” standard set forth in 
Steiner, the majority of circuits employ similar tests that reflect 
Congress’s intent to construe work liberally under the PPA.108  In fact, 
only one circuit, the Second Circuit, has construed Steiner narrowly.109  
In the Ninth Circuit, an activity is integral and indispensable if it (1) is 
necessary for the principal work performed, and (2) primarily benefits 
the employer.110  Activities performed predominantly in the employees’ 
interest or for the employees’ own convenience are excluded.111  An act 
is necessary to the principal work performed if it is required by law, the 
employer, or by the nature of the work.112  The Ninth Circuit referred to 
Section 790.8(c) of the DOL regulations, which interpret the PPA, when 
explaining the test.113  Section 790.8(c) states that changing clothes is 
integral and indispensable when “required by the law, by rules of the 
                                                                                                                                     
 105 IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 36–37, 40. 
 106 Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2003) (“‘When the matter in 
issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled working 
hours,’ the Supreme Court has observed, ‘such trifles may be disregarded[, for] [s]plit-
second absurdities are not justified by the actualities or working conditions or by the 
policy of the [FLSA].’” (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery 
Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946))).  But cf. 29 C.F.R. § 790.8 n.63 (1970) (noting that “[i]n a 
colloquy between Senators McGrath and Cooper, 93 Cong. Rec. 2298, Senator Cooper 
stated that ‘There was no definite purpose in using the words ‘30 minutes’ instead of 15 
or 10 minutes or 5 minutes or any other number of minutes.’  In reply to questions, he 
indicated that any amount of time spent in preparatory activities of the types referred to in 
the examples would be regarded as a part of the employee’s principal activity and within 
the compensable workday.”). 
 107 IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 37, 40. 
 108 See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Perez, 
650 F.3d 350; Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010); Bonilla v. Baker 
Concrete Constr., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2007); Ballaris v. Wacker Siltronic 
Corp., 370 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2004); Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894; Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d 
1123 (10th Cir. 1994); Dunlop v. City Electric, 527 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying 
similar integral and indispensable test to different set of facts); see also 29 C.F.R. § 790.1 
(1970). 
 109 Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 594 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 110 See Perez, 650 F.3d 350; Ballaris, 370 F.3d 901; Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894. 
 111 Perez, 650 F.3d at 366; Dunlop, 527 F.2d at 398–99. 
 112 Perez, 650 F.3d at 366 (citation omitted). 
 113 Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 903. 
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employer, or by the nature of the work.”114  The circuits that have applied 
Steiner in the meat and poultry processing context have employed the 
same or a similar test as the Ninth Circuit and have found that time spent 
donning and doffing safety gear is integral and indispensable to the 
principal work activity at issue and must be compensated if not de 
minimis.115 
As noted above, however, one circuit has applied Steiner 
narrowly.116  The Second Circuit, in Gorman v. Consolidated Edison 
Corp., concluded that Steiner applies only to measures necessary to enter 
and work within a lethal working environment.117  Gorman involved 
workers in a nuclear plant who claimed they should have been paid for 
time spent complying with security procedures and donning and doffing 
safety gear.118  The court examined dictionary definitions to determine 
the meaning of “integral and indispensable,” finding indispensable to 
mean “necessary” and integral to mean “essential to completeness.”119  
The court provided an example of integral: “[A] diver’s donning of 
wetsuit, oxygen tank and mouthpiece may be integral to the work even 
though it is not the (underwater) task that the employer wishes done.”120  
While the court found that the donning and doffing of safety gear may 
have been indispensable, it concluded it was not integral to the principal 
work activities, despite the fact that safety gear was required by the law 
and the employer, because the employees did not work in a lethal 
atmosphere.121 
C. Section 203(o) of the FLSA 
Section 203(o) is included within the definitions section of the 
FLSA.  It was added to the FLSA in 1949, two years after the PPA, to 
                                                                                                                                     
 114 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) & n.65 (1970). 
 115 Perez, 650 F.3d 350; Franklin, 619 F.3d 604; Bonilla, 487 F.3d 1340; see also 
Tum v. Barber, 360 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding donning and doffing of safety gear 
integral and indispensable, but because the time was de minimis, the court did not order 
compensation), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 
546 U.S. 21 (2005); Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894; Reich, 38 F.3d 1123. 
 116 Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 594 (2d Cir. 2007).  But cf. 
Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202, 209 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Gorman in 
concluding that donning and doffing the type of work clothing at issue—a postal 
worker’s uniform, gloves, and work shoes—was not integral and indispensable to the 
employee’s principal activities because it was not extensive and unique, but declining to 
discuss the work environment). 
 117 Gorman, 488 F.3d at 593. 
 118 Id. at 589. 
 119 Id. at 592. 
 120 Id. at 593. 
 121 Id. at 593–94 (finding that Steiner applied to workers at a nuclear plant, but only 
those who worked in the nuclear containment area). 
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strengthen the PPA and avoid another set of lawsuits like those that had 
led to the Act’s enactment.122  Section 203(o) defines hours worked, 
permitting employers and union representatives to decide whether to 
compensate time spent changing clothes and washing at the start and end 
of the workday.123 
Hours Worked.—In determining for the purposes of sections 206 
and 207 of this title the hours for which an employee is employed, 
there shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or 
washing at the beginning or end of each workday which was 
excluded from measured working time during the week involved by 
the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide 
collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the particular 
employee.124 
The original House Bill proposed that any activity could be 
bargained away so long as it was part of a CBA.125  Senator Herter, who 
introduced the amendment, used CBAs in the bakery industry to 
exemplify what he hoped the amendment would allow.126  In the bakery 
industry, there existed CBAs that provided that time spent changing 
clothes at the end of the day would count as part of the workday; in other 
CBAs, it was not considered part of the workday.127  Senator Herter 
argued that, in both cases, the CBAs were “carefully threshed out 
between the employer and the employee,” and “both [parties] [were] 
completely satisfied.”128  The Conference Committee narrowed the scope 
of Section 203(o) by limiting the exclusion to time employees spend 
changing clothes and washing at the beginning and end of the workday, 
and the final bill incorporated this limitation.129 
Although the legislative history, the PPA, and the DOL regulations 
provide some guidance as to how Section 203(o) should be interpreted, 
                                                                                                                                     
 122 Anderson v. Cagle’s Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 958 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 95 CONG. 
REC. 11,433 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1949) (comments of Rep. Herter). 
 123 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006). 
 124 Id. 
 125 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter No. FLSA2010-2 (June 16, 
2010), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_2.htm#.UK
BVeIV-x7I (citing S. REP. NO. 81-640 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2241, 
2255). 
 126 Id. (citing 95 CONG. REC. H11210 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1949) (statement of Rep. 
Herter)). 
 127 Id. (citing same). 
 128 Id. (citing same). 
 129 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. 
Letter No. FLSA2010-2 (June 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_2.htm#.UK
BVeIV-x7I (citation omitted). 
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no United States Supreme Court decision has directly interpreted Section 
203(o).130  As a result, there has been considerable disagreement among 
the federal courts with respect to the interpretation of Section 203(o) and 
similar inconsistencies within the DOL Opinion Letters.131  The main 
issue to be addressed is whether “clothing” includes safety gear.  A 
second, but related, issue is whether Section 203(o) is an exemption 
requiring narrow interpretation.  Lastly, there is disagreement over what 
constitutes a “custom or practice” under Section 203(o). 
1. DOL Advisories Addressing Section 203(o) 
The DOL, the administrative agency responsible for enacting 
regulations and enforcing the FLSA, has issued several advisories on the 
meaning of “clothes” within Section 203(o) and whether this includes 
safety equipment.132  Since its first opinion letter in 1997, the DOL’s 
position has changed multiple times, typically in conjunction with 
political party changes in the executive branch.133  Due to the DOL’s 
repeated position change, the federal circuits have not given deference to 
the DOL’s interpretation nor are they required to.134 
In 1997, the DOL considered whether donning and doffing safety 
gear was covered by Section 203(o) and determined that, because 
Section 203(o) “provides an exemption from the broad, remedial 
provisions of the FLSA, it must be interpreted narrowly” and does not 
apply to the donning and doffing of safety gear.135  It further explained 
that the common usage of “clothing” refers to apparel and not safety 
gear, “which is generally worn over such apparel and may be 
                                                                                                                                     
 130 See generally Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 131–32 (1994) (explaining that 
Section 203(o) provides employees with minimum labor standards absent an agreement 
to the contrary); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 741 n.19 
(1981) (“Section [20]3(o) of the [PPA] . . .  excludes from the definition of ‘hours 
worked’ under §§ 6 and 7 of the FLSA, ‘any time spent in changing clothes or washing at 
the beginning or end of each workday’ if that time was noncompensable ‘under a bona 
fide collective-bargaining agreement.’”); Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 255 (1956). 
(“[I]ts clear implication is that clothes changing and washing, which are otherwise part of 
the principal activity, may be expressly excluded from coverage by the agreement.”). 
 131 See infra notes 132–45, 146–50 and accompanying text. 
 132 Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 612–13 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing DOL 
Opinion Letters); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FIELD OPERATIONS 
HANDBOOK CH. 31 (Dec. 15, 2000); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Advisory 
Memorandum No. 2006-2 (May 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/FieldBulletins/AdvisoryMemo2006_2.htm#.UKBXJoV-x7I. 
 133 Franklin, 619 F.3d at 612–14. 
 134 I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987); Salazar v. Butterball, 
LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1139 (10th Cir. 2011); Franklin, 619 F.3d at 612–14. 
 135 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter, 1997 WL 998048, at *1 (Dec. 
3, 1997). 
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cumbersome in nature.”136  In 2001, the DOL restated this position in 
another letter.137 
In 2002, the DOL published another letter with a different 
opinion.138  The letter declared that “changing clothes” within Section 
203(o) applies to the donning and doffing of safety gear typically worn in 
the meat packing industry.139  The letter explained that “clothing” 
includes “items worn on the body for covering, protection, or sanitation, 
but [does] not . . . include tools or other implements such as knives, 
scabbards, or meat hooks.”140  The DOL restated this position in a 2007 
opinion letter and further clarified that “clothing includes, among other 
items, heavy protective safety equipment worn in the meat packing 
industry such as mesh aprons, sleeves and gloves, plastic belly guards, 
arm guards, and shin guards.” 141 
 In 2010, the DOL reverted back to the position it had taken in 
1997 and 2001.142  It stated that dictionary definitions are not helpful 
because they are a collection of a word’s various meanings and depend 
on context.143  The DOL looked to the legislative history and found that 
the “clothes” Congress had in mind when it narrowed Section 203(o) 
were those that workers wore in the bakery industry and hardly 
resembled the safety gear used in today’s meat and poultry industry.144  
The DOL concluded that Section 203(o) does not cover safety gear that 
is required by law, the employer, or by the nature of the job.145 
2. Circuit Law Addressing Clothing within Section 203(o) 
In light of the DOL’s lack of consistency, it should come as no 
surprise that there is a circuit split over the meaning and interpretation of 
“clothing” under Section 203(o).146  The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
                                                                                                                                     
 136 Id. 
 137 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter, 2001 WL 58864, at *1 (Jan. 
15, 2001). 
 138 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter No. FLSA2002-2 (June 6, 
2002), available at www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2002/2002_06_06_2_FLSA.pdf. 
 139 Id. at *1. 
 140 Id. at *3. 
 141 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter No. FLSA2007-10 (May 14, 
2007), available at www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2007/2007_05_14_10_FLSA.pdf. 
 142 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter No. FLSA2010-2 (June 16, 
2010), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_2.htm#.UK
BVeIV-x7I. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1137 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing 
circuit split). 
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Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have found that safety equipment 
constitutes clothing” under the section.147  Yet, none of those circuits was 
willing to declare a per se rule.148  Only the Ninth Circuit has found that 
the donning and doffing of safety equipment does not “fit within 
[20]3(o)’s ‘clothing’ term.”149  Similarly, the circuits are split over 
whether Section 203(o) should be treated as an exemption and require a 
narrow construction.150 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez involved 
employees working at a beef processing plant, who were required to 
wear extensive safety gear.151  The Ninth Circuit held that Section 203(o) 
did not cover safety equipment.152  The court looked to the “ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning” of the relevant language because it 
found inadequate guidance in case law and legislative history.153  The 
Ninth Circuit first rejected the broad definition of “clothing” proposed by 
IBP, Inc., explaining that FLSA exemptions “are to be construed 
narrowly against the employer.”154  The court refused to apply 
exemptions unless they “plainly and unmistakably” fit, and protective 
gear did not “plainly and unmistakably” fit within Section 203(o)’s 
“clothing” term, according to the court.155 
                                                                                                                                     
 147 Salazar, 644 F.3d 1130; Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010); 
Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2010); Sepulveda v. Allen 
Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2009); Anderson v. Cagle’s Inc., 488 F.3d 945 
(11th Cir. 2007); Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2001) (addressing 
a dispute over law enforcement uniforms, not safety gear); Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 269 
F.3d 477, 480 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) (determining that safety equipment worn while 
manufacturing surgical needles and sutures constituted clothing). 
 148 See supra note 146. 
 149 Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003); see also In re Cargill Meat 
Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 368, 379–80, 382–83 (M.D. Pa. 2008) 
(describing district court decisions coming down on both sides). 
 150 Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1138 (discussing circuit split). 
 151 IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 32 (2005) (addressing whether post-donning and 
pre-doffing walking time is excluded by the PPA; Section 203(o) was not at issue); 
Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 898. 
 152 Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 905. 
 153 Id. at 904. 
 154 Id. at 905 (citing Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)); see 
also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 741 n.19 (1981) 
(referring to Section 203(o) and other FLSA provisions as exceptions to the FLSA); 
Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 748, 751 (3d Cir. 1982) (interpreting Section 203(i) 
narrowly); In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 384; 
Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1072–76 (D. Minn. 2007); U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter, 1997 WL 998048, at *1 (Dec. 3, 1997) 
(classifying Section 203(o) as an exemption). 
 155 Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 905. 
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Second, the Ninth Circuit explained that specialized protective 
equipment is different than typical clothing.156  When feeling cold, one 
does not consider putting on “a bullet-proof vest or an environmental 
spacesuit.  Rather, personal protective equipment generally refers to 
materials worn by an individual to provide a barrier against exposure to 
workplace hazards.”157  The court pointed to an Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration regulation, which distinguished personal 
protective equipment from general work clothes, and stated that general 
work clothes are not intended to function as protection against workplace 
hazards.158  Government-mandated personal protective equipment is not 
an appropriate subject for collective bargaining because it would not be 
in the interest of public policy to provide disincentives for use.159 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, in Sepulveda v. Allen 
Family Foods, Inc., held that the meaning of “clothes” within Section 
203(o) embraces safety equipment.160  Sepulveda involved employees at 
a poultry processing plant, wearing what the court described as “standard 
safety equipment.”161  Because the statute did not define “clothing,” the 
Fourth Circuit looked to the dictionary to ascertain the plain meaning of 
the word, which was defined as “covering for the human body or 
garments in general: all the garments and accessories worn by a person at 
any one time.”162  Since the statute referred to “clothes,” the court 
determined that the most straightforward interpretation of the term 
embraced all clothing, because even street clothes are worn for some 
degree of protection.163  The court noted that Congress intended the 
statute to encompass work clothes, and administrative regulations had 
also referred to safety gear as clothing.164  The Fourth Circuit concluded 
that all of the safety gear at issue fit within the definition.165  Other 
circuits that have found safety equipment to fall within the definition of 
“clothing” have either followed Sepulveda or adopted comparable 
reasoning.166 
                                                                                                                                     
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.130(b) (1999)). 
 159 Id. at 905 n.8. 
 160 Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 211 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 214–16. 
 163 Id. at 215. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 216. 
 166 Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1138–41 (10th Cir. 2011); Franklin v. 
Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614–15 (6th Cir. 2010); Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 
614 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2010); Anderson v. Cagle’s Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 956 (11th Cir. 
2007); Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 269 F.3d 477, 480 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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With the exception of the Ninth Circuit, federal appellate courts 
that have addressed whether Section 203(o) should be treated as an 
exemption—and, therefore, narrowly construed—have answered that 
question in the negative.167  The Tenth Circuit, in Salazar v. Butterball, 
LLC, involved workers at a turkey processing plant who were required to 
wear various pieces of safety equipment.168  The Tenth Circuit explained 
that the term “clothing” is ambiguous, pointing to the many, differing 
interpretations of the circuit courts and the DOL.169  The court ultimately 
found that Section 203(o) is not an exemption because (1) it was not 
specifically designated as such by Congress; (2) it removes “discrete 
activities” from the definition of hours worked, whereas other FLSA 
exemptions remove entire classes of employees; and (3) it gives parties 
the option of removing discrete activities through the process of 
collective bargaining.170 
The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have also held that 
Section 203(o) is not an exemption, adopting reasoning similar to the 
Tenth Circuit.171 
3. Case Law Addressing Custom and Practice under Section 
203(o) 
Section 203(o) permits the exclusion of time based upon “the 
express terms of or . . . custom or practice under a bona fide collective-
bargaining agreement.”172  The majority of cases that reach the circuit 
courts involve situations where the nonpayment of donning and doffing 
is held to be a custom or practice under a CBA.  The Third, Fifth, Sixth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits do not require parties to negotiate or discuss 
the compensation of time spent donning and doffing safety gear in order 
to establish a custom or practice.173  A custom or practice can be 
                                                                                                                                     
 167 Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1138; Franklin, 619 F.3d at 611–12; Allen v. McWane, Inc., 
593 F.3d 449, 458 (5th Cir. 2010); Anderson, 488 F.3d at 957.  But cf. Adams v. United 
States, 471 F.3d 1321, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that exclusions under the PPA 
that are similar to Section 203 are not exemptions); Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262 
F.3d 222, 226–27 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing Section 203(o) as an exclusion). 
 168 Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1134. 
 169 Id. at 1138. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding 
that Section 203(o) is an exclusion but not an exemption and describing the PPA as an 
exemption); Franklin, 619 F.3d at 611–12; Allen, 593 F.3d at 458; Anderson, 488 F.3d at 
957–58. 
 172 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006). 
 173 Salazar, 644 F.3d 1130; Franklin, 619 F.3d at 617 (citing Allen, 593 F.3d at 457); 
Anderson, 488 F.3d at 958–59; Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262 F.3d 222, 226–27 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
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established as long as there has been a prolonged period of acquiescence 
and a CBA.174 
Some district courts have interpreted custom or practice differently 
than the circuit courts.175  These district courts require a prolonged period 
of nonpayment during which employees knowingly acquiesce.176  The 
reason these courts require more than a history of nonpayment is 
because, otherwise, “[Section] 203(o) would essentially be an unlimited 
FLSA exemption applicable to every unionized employer that did not 
pay for clothes-changing time.”  These courts do not believe that Section 
203(o) is so sweeping.177 
D. The FLSA, the NLRA, and Preemption 
Adding to the confusion among the circuits is the additional 
question of whether Section 203(o) and the NLRA preempt more 
protective state laws.178  The FLSA explicitly grants states the authority 
to create such laws,179 and all federal court decisions that have addressed 
the issue have concluded that such laws are not preempted by Section 
203(o).180  Nevertheless, some employers have asserted that Section 
203(o) preempts state law.181  The more complex question, however, is 
whether the NLRA preempts state laws that provide more protection than 
Section 203(o).  The issue of whether the NLRA can preempt a state law 
that requires a shorter workweek in the context of Section 203(o) has 
been addressed by several district courts and one circuit court.182 
                                                                                                                                     
 174 Franklin, 619 F.3d at 617. 
 175 See Figas v. Horsehead Corp., No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 4170043 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 
2008); Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Minn. 2007); Fox v. Tyson Foods, 
Inc., No. CV-99-BE-1612-M, 2002 WL 32987224, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2002), 
overruled by Nos. 4:9–CV–1612–VEH, 4:06–CV–4676–VEH, 4:06–CV–4677–VEH, 
2007 WL 6477624 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2007). 
 176 Franklin, 619 F.3d at 617 n.5. 
 177 Kassa, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. 
 178 Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Cargill 
Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 368 (M.D. Pa. 2008); Chavez v. 
IBP, Inc., No. CV-01-5093-RHW, 2005 WL 6304840 (E.D. Wash. May 16, 2005). 
 179 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1967). 
 180 See sources cited supra note 178. 
 181 Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 21. 
 182 Spoerle, 614 F.3d 427; Martinez v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., Nos. 
8:09CV247, 4:09CV3079, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58457 (D. Neb. Apr. 12, 2011); 
O’Keefe v. Hess Corp., No. 10-2598 (WJM), 2010 WL 3522088 (D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2010); 
In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 368; Townsend v. BC 
Natural Chicken LLC, No. 06-4317, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 
2007). 
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1. The FLSA and Preemption 
i. The FLSA Savings Clause, Section 218 
The FLSA contains a savings clause, 20 U.S.C. § 218, which 
expressly permits states to promulgate more protective laws and establish 
higher minimum wages and shorter maximum workweeks.183  Courts 
have recognized that “[t]he intent of § 218(a) was to leave undisturbed 
‘the traditional exercise of the states’ police powers with respect to 
wages and hours more generous than the federal standards.’”184  The 
purpose behind the FLSA, therefore, “is to establish a national floor 
under which wage protections cannot drop, not to establish absolute 
uniformity in minimum wage and overtime standards nationwide at 
levels established in the FLSA.”185  The overall effect is to afford states 
“a continuing role in regulating wages and hours (subject to federal 
minimums).”186 
ii. Circuit Law Addressing Section 203(o) and Preemption 
In Spoerle v. Kraft, the first federal appellate decision addressing 
the issue of preemption, the Seventh Circuit held that Section 203(o) did 
not preempt a more protective Wisconsin state law.187  The employees in 
Spoerle worked at a meat processing plant and were required to wear 
several items of safety gear.188  The required donning and doffing of 
safety gear took five to twelve minutes each day, and the CBA did not 
                                                                                                                                     
 183 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (1967).  Section 218(a) provides: 
No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with 
any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher 
than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum work week lower 
than the maximum workweek established under this chapter . . . . [N]o provision of this 
chapter shall justify any employer in reducing a wage paid by him which is in excess of 
the applicable minimum wage under this chapter, or justify any employer in increasing 
hours of employment maintained by him which are shorter than the maximum hours 
applicable under this chapter.  Id. 
 184 In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 393. 
 185 Id. (quoting Pacific Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1425 (9th 
Cir. 1990)). 
 186 Dorris, supra note 5, at 1256. 
 187 Spoerle, 614 F.3d at 430; see also Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1143 
(10th Cir. 2011) (finding Colorado law, which had no statutory equivalent to Section 
203(o), did not apply to the defendant and, therefore, declining to reach the issue of 
preemption); In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 393 
(noting, in dicta, that Section 203(o) would not preempt state law); Chavez v. IBP, Inc., 
No. CV-01-5093-RHW, 2005 WL 6304840, at *36 (E.D. Wash. May 16, 2005) (finding 
that Section 203(o) does not preempt state law). 
 188 Spoerle, 614 F.3d at 428. 
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guarantee payment for this time.189  The employees wanted compensation 
for these minutes at the higher rate of pay that was agreed upon during 
bargaining.190  They argued that the safety gear at issue was not 
“clothing” under Section 203(o) and that Wisconsin law did not have a 
provision equivalent to Section 203(o) requiring payment for time spent 
donning and doffing safety gear.191  Relying on the Fourth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Sepulveda, the court held that the safety gear constituted 
“clothing” under Section 203(o) and subsequently sought to determine 
whether Wisconsin law was preempted by Section 203(o).192 
In concluding that Wisconsin law was not preempted, the Seventh 
Circuit first pointed to the introduction of Section 203(o) and stated that 
there was nothing in the section that limited the application of the FLSA 
Savings Clause.193  “States are free to set higher hourly wages or shorter 
periods before overtime pay comes due.”194  As an example, the court 
cited a CBA providing payment of $8 per hour when the state minimum 
wage was $8.25 per hour and the federal minimum wage was $7.25 per 
hour.195  The court asserted that the more protective state law would 
trump the CBA and require payment of $8.25 per hour. 196  Indeed, the 
state law would trump both a CBA setting an hourly wage below the 
minimum wage and one requiring a greater number of hours to be 
worked in order to earn overtime pay.197 
Despite the lack of case law supporting their position, practitioners 
who represent management in labor and employment litigation have 
asserted arguments in support of Section 203(o) preemption.198  These 
practitioners rely on Sepulveda, a Fourth Circuit decision, which did not 
address preemption but characterized Section 203(o) as a preference for 
private resolution of specified workplace concerns.199  State law that 
refuses to acknowledge Section 203(o) presents an obstacle to 
accomplishing Congress’ purpose by preventing bargaining.200  Deferring 
                                                                                                                                     
 189 Id.; Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 913 (W.D. Wis. 2009); 
Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 860 (W.D. Wis. 2007). 
 190 Spoerle, 614 F.3d at 428. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. (citing Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 214–16 (4th Cir. 
2009)). 
 193 Id. at 429. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 430. 
 196 Spoerle, 614 F.3d at 430. 
 197 Id. at 429. 
 198 Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 21. 
 199 Id. at 873 & n.151 (citing Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 
219 (4th Cir. 2009)). 
 200 Id. at 873. 
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to the CBA, as opposed to strictly adhering to statutory mandate, is more 
aligned with the spirit of the FLSA when it comes to protecting 
workers.201  Section 203(o) is a unique provision allowing parties to 
waive their rights under the FLSA through collective bargaining, and it 
should not be taken away by state legislation.202 
2. The NLRA and Preemption 
i. The NLRA & the LMRA 
In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA to give employees the right to 
organize and bargain collectively.203  Congress found that the denial of 
these rights results in economic recession due to depressed wages, 
decreased purchasing power, and the lack of adequate working 
conditions.204  It also found that protecting employees’ rights to organize 
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce by preventing industrial 
unrest and obstructions in the free flow of commerce.205  Furthermore, 
permitting the formation of unions allows workers to compete fairly with 
corporations, which are also collective entities.206 
The NLRA was amended in 1947 by the LMRA.207  Section 301 of 
the LMRA has been interpreted to require a common federal law for all 
CBAs in order to maintain uniformity and consistency in their 
interpretation and application.208  Thus, Section 301 preempts state law 
claims requiring the interpretation or application of a CBA.209 
In enacting the NLRA, however, Congress envisioned the 
coexistence of federal labor laws and minimum state labor protections 
for employees who bargain collectively.210  Determining whether the 
NLRA preempts state labor laws involves a delicate balance between 
maintaining uniform federal laws on collective bargaining and permitting 
states to provide stronger labor protections for their citizens.211  There are 
times when preemption may interfere with state laws that offer stronger 
                                                                                                                                     
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947). 
 204 Id. § 151. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 207 Id. § 141. 
 208 Id. § 185(a); Kirsten M. Nelson, Section 301 of the LMRA Does Not Require 
Preemption of a Minimum State Labor Standard if the Legal Character of the Claim Is 
Independent of the Rights in a Collective Bargaining Agreement: Livadas v. Bradshaw, 
36 B.C. L. REV. 330, 331–32 (1995). 
 209 Nelson, supra note 208, at 332. 
 210 Id. at 331. 
 211 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1947). 
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labor protections.212  The Supreme Court has developed rules to deal with 
this type of conflict.213 
ii. The Supreme Court Addresses the LMRA 
In Livadas v. Bradshaw, a California state law required the 
provision of unpaid wages immediately upon an employee’s termination, 
but the CBA at issue dictated otherwise.214  Thus, the employee in 
Livadas was forced to choose between enforcing her state labor rights 
and entering a CBA.215  The Supreme Court noted that “forcing 
employees . . . to bargain for what they [are] otherwise . . . entitled to” 
under state law is not part of federal labor law policy.216  It stated, 
“[Section] 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights 
conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law.”217  To 
survive preemption, the Court explained, “[t]he legal character of the 
state . . . claim must be ‘independent’ of the rights under the collective 
bargaining agreement . . . . [I]f the rights and duties asserted in the state 
claim arise out of the contractual obligation of the collective bargaining 
agreement, section 301 preempts the state claim.”218  When the meaning 
of the contract is not the subject of dispute, states can consult CBAs to 
resolve disputes without triggering preemption because the CBA may 
have information helpful in determining damages in a state suit.219 
iii. Circuit Law Addressing the LMRA 
While a few district courts have addressed the issue, only one 
federal circuit court has ruled on whether state law should be preempted 
by the LMRA when Section 203(o) is involved.220  Relying on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, 
                                                                                                                                     
 212 Nelson, supra note 208, at 332. 
 213 Id. at 332–34. 
 214 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994). 
 215 Id. at 117. 
 216 Id. at 130. 
 217 Id. at 123 (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988); 
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)). 
 218 Nelson, supra note 208, at 339; see also Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123–24. 
 219 Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124; Nelson, supra note 208, at 339. 
 220 Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2010); see also 
Martinez v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., Nos. 8:09CV247, 4:09CV3079, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 58457 (D. Neb. Apr. 12, 2011) (preemption); O’Keefe v. Hess Corp., No. 
10-2598 (WJM), 2010 WL 3522088 (D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2010) (no preemption); In re Cargill 
Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 368, 392, 397 (M.D. Pa. 2008) 
(noting, in dicta, that the LMRA would preempt state law); Townsend v. BC Natural 
Chicken LLC, No. 06-4317, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2007) 
(finding state law claims requiring compensation for donning and doffing were 
preempted by the LMRA). 
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Inc., the Seventh Circuit in Spoerle found that Wisconsin law was not 
preempted because the law was not “interpreting or enforcing the 
collective bargaining agreement.”221  The Seventh Circuit found that 
nothing requires Wisconsin law to interpret or enforce the CBA.222  What 
is required is that the CBA “be ignored, to the extent that it sets lower 
wages or hours than state law specifies.”223  The court ignored a 
provision in the CBA that did not require employees to be compensated 
for donning and doffing safety gear.224  The court compared the situation 
to a state law requiring a higher minimum wage than federal law 
requires, and noted that a CBA paying the federal minimum wage would 
have to give way to a state law requiring a higher minimum wage.225  
The court recognized that every state law could affect collective 
bargaining, because knowing that state law requires higher overtime may 
lead labor and management to agree to a lower base pay.226 
iv. District Court Law on the LMRA 
Although there are only a few district court decisions addressing the 
issue, they are split over whether the LMRA should preempt more 
protective state laws concerning donning and doffing.  O’Keefe v. Hess 
Corp. followed the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Spoerle and did not 
find preemption, while the other district courts have concluded that the 
LMRA preempts state law.227 
In In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litigation, 
employees of a meat processing plant filed several wage and hour claims, 
including a claim for unpaid wages for time spent donning and doffing 
safety gear. 228  Although the court found that the donning and doffing of 
safety gear was compensable, as it did not find safety gear to constitute 
“clothing,”229 it still analyzed whether Section 203(o) and the LMRA 
                                                                                                                                     
 221 Spoerle, 614 F.3d at 430; see also infra Part IV(B)(2) (describing Lingle in further 
detail). 
 222 Spoerle, 614 F.3d at 429–30. 
 223 Id. at 430. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 O’Keefe v. Hess Corp., No. 10-2598 (WJM), 2010 WL 3522088 (D.N.J. Sept. 1, 
2010); see also Spoerle, 614 F.3d 427; Martinez v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., Nos. 
8:09CV247, 4:09CV3079, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58457, at *51–53 (D. Neb. Apr. 12, 
2011) (finding preemption and citing Seventh Circuit district court cases prior to Spoerle 
that found LMRA preemption); In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. 
Supp. 2d 368 (M.D. Pa. 2008); Townsend v. BC Natural Chicken LLC, No. 06-4317, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2007). 
 228 In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 371. 
 229 Id. at 378. 
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would preempt Pennsylvania law.230  Thus, in dicta, the court found that 
Section 203(o) would not preempt the Pennsylvania law because the 
FLSA explicitly permits states to enact laws mandating higher minimum 
wages and/or shorter maximum workweeks.231  With respect to LMRA, 
the court stated that state law would be preempted by the Act because it 
would require interpretation of the CBA.232  Although there were no 
express terms addressing the donning and doffing of safety equipment, 
the court found that resolving state law claims would require an 
interpretation of the implied terms of the CBA,233 which the court 
determined were five minutes of compensation per day for mesh-wearing 
employees and no compensation for non-mesh-wearing employees.234 
In reaching its conclusion, the court cited a decision from the same 
circuit, Townsend v. BC Natural Chicken LLC.235  In Townsend, 
employees brought several wage and hour claims, including claims 
involving the time spent donning and doffing protective gear.236  The 
employees argued that their case was analogous to Livadas,237 and that 
the court needed to look only to the CBA to offset the time the 
employees were already compensated.238  The court found that 
determining whether the time spent donning and doffing was 
compensable required interpretation of the CBA, which expressly 
provided “twelve (12) minutes of pay per week to provide for wash up 
time,” and therefore, the state law claims were preempted.239 
ANALYSIS 
This article argues two points.  The first is that Section 203(o) 
should be construed narrowly to exclude safety gear and, therefore, 
require compensation for donning and doffing.  The second is that, even 
if Section 203(o) is found to include safety gear, more protective state 
laws, requiring compensation for donning and doffing, should not be 
preempted by either Section 203(o) or the NLRA. 
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A. Section 203(o) Should Exclude “Required Safety Gear”240 
1. “Required Safety Gear” is Defined in the DOL’s Regulations 
and Used for Determining What Constitutes a Principal 
Activity by the Federal Circuit Courts. 
The DOL’s regulations should be followed in interpreting Section 
203(o) for several reasons.  First, the regulations not only are consistent 
with the legislative intent of Congress, they also were approved by 
Congress.  Second, the majority of circuits already rely upon the 
regulations to help define principal activities (i.e., work) under the PPA.  
Lastly, employers will not face extraordinary liability because activities 
that are de minimis do not require compensation. 
Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Labor intended for the 
phrase “principal activities” under the PPA to be construed broadly.  On 
the other hand, “preliminary” and “postliminary” activities under the 
PPA were intended to be construed narrowly and not to be used as a tool 
to avoid compensating employees.  In accordance with these intentions, 
the DOL’s regulations broadly define principal activities and specifically 
mention Congress’s intent within their text. 241  Further, by enacting 
Section 16(c), Congress approved of the regulations shortly after they 
were issued by the Secretary of Labor, which suggests that the 
interpretation was consistent with its intent.242 
DOL regulations are enacted specifically to explain the PPA.  The 
regulations define principal activities as “activities which the employee 
is ‘employed to perform’” and “all activities which are an integral part of 
a principal activity.”243  There is no categorical list of “preliminary” and 
“postliminary” activities except those mentioned in the PPA, and, 
depending on the circumstances, an activity can be either principal or 
preliminary.244  “[C]hecking in and out and waiting in line to do so, 
changing clothes, washing up or showering, and waiting in line to 
                                                                                                                                     
 240 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) & n.65 (1970) (referring to “required safety gear” and 
including items “required by law, by rules of the employer, or by the nature of the work,” 
but not those worn primarily for the employee’s convenience); see also supra notes 108–
15 and accompanying text (describing test for “principal activity”). 
 241 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a)–(c) (1970); see also supra notes 108–15 and accompanying 
text. 
 242 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 243 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a)–(b) (1970); see also 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) (1970) (“Among 
the activities included as an integral part of a principal activity are those closely related 
activities which are indispensable to its performance.”). 
 244 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(b) (1970). 
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receive pay checks” may be preliminary or postliminary activities.245  
Importantly, if the changing of clothes or washing is “required by law, by 
rules of the employer, or by the nature of the work,” it is an integral and 
indispensable part of the job.246  This language is consistent with the 
legislative intent of Congress. 
The majority of circuit courts look to the DOL regulations for 
guidance in applying the PPA.  In determining whether the time spent 
donning and doffing safety gear requires compensation, almost all 
circuits look to whether the activity is (1) necessary for the work and (2) 
primarily benefits the employer.  In applying the first part of this test, 
circuits look to whether the activity is “required by the law, by rules of 
the employer, or by the nature of the work.”247  The circuits cite to 
Section 790.8(c) of the regulations for this language.  Additionally, the 
Secretary of Labor has relied on this language in its Advisory Opinions, 
explaining that Section 203(o) does not include safety gear. 
To produce a safe product for consumption, employees in the meat 
and poultry processing industry are required—by the law, the nature of 
the work, and their employers—to don and doff safety gear.  The high 
death and injury rates of workers on the job, as well as the illness and 
death of workers and consumers from food contamination, clearly 
demonstrate that the nature of the work requires multiple protective 
measures.248   Employees are exposed to lethal chemicals that are 
required for sanitation, lethal biological toxins from animals, hazardous 
tools and machinery used to kill and dismantle large animals (or poultry), 
and other hazardous working conditions created by continuous, repetitive 
cutting motions in cramped workspaces at unsafe speeds.249  The 
Occupational Safety and Health Standards, the Federal Meat Inspection 
                                                                                                                                     
 245 29 C.F.R § 790.7(g) (1970); see also 29 C.F.R § 790.7(h) (1970) (noting that when 
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 246 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) & n.65 (1970); 29 C.F.R § 790.7(g) n.49 (1970). 
 247 See supra notes 108–15 and accompanying text. 
 248 Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2003); see supra notes 1, 33. 
 249 See supra note 10. 
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Act, and the Poultry Products Inspection Act govern and require the use 
of safety equipment and sanitary procedures within the meat and poultry 
processing industry.250  When determining whether an activity is integral 
and indispensable and thus work, the majority of circuits cite to these 
federal regulatory schemes.251  Furthermore, state law regimes, industrial 
groups, insurers, and individual employers have their own requirements 
and policies, which courts also examine to determine whether an activity 
is integral and indispensable and thus work.252 
Courts assessing whether an article of clothing or safety gear fits 
within the Section 203(o) exception are already familiar with the DOL’s 
“required safety gear” standard, as it is already in common use.  While 
interpretation of “required safety gear” is not as clear as, for instance, a 
bright-line rule stating that all safety gear constitutes “clothing” and 
should be covered by Section 203(o), it better conforms with Congress’s 
intent behind and interpretation of the PPA and provides adequate and 
uniform guidance on which activities should be compensated. 
Furthermore, even if the donning and doffing of safety gear is 
found to be excluded from Section 203(o) because it is required by law, 
courts should apply the de minimis test used in determining a “principal 
activity” under the PPA.253  If time spent donning and doffing is de 
minimis, the employer should not be required to compensate for it.  
Although this interpretation would result in less coverage under Section 
203(o) for employees who wear required safety gear, it would not 
necessarily result in more liability for the employer. 
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F.3d 361 (3d Cir. 2007); In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 
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6304840, at *36 (E.D. Wash. May 16, 2005). 
 253 IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 32 (2005). 
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2. Section 203(o) Applies to Regular Work Clothing 
There are significant practical and legal distinctions between 
normal clothing and safety gear that prevent Section 203(o) from being 
rendered meaningless when it is construed narrowly to exclude required 
safety gear.  Employees wearing normal clothing can still bargain over 
whether time spent changing clothes and washing should be 
compensated.  But, because a meatpacker or poultry worker cannot 
conduct his or her job without wearing safety gear, the donning and 
doffing of safety gear is considered a principal activity and not merely 
clothes-changing.  Parties should be precluded from bargaining over 
whether this time is compensated. 
In Fox v. Tyson Food, Inc., the court discerned the practical 
difference between clothing and safety gear.  There, the district court 
held that safety gear worn at a chicken plant could not be regarded as a 
mere analog to clothing because the everyday, plain meaning of the term 
“clothing” describes “what most people do every day—taking off 
pajamas to put on work clothes in the morning, or taking off dress 
clothes to put on casual wear in the evening.” 254  The court further 
explained that a police officer’s uniform is different because it replaces 
the clothing the officer wore before work, and a police officer can drive 
to work in her uniform, whereas plant workers cannot be expected to 
drive to work “wearing boots, arm guards, plastic aprons, and several 
layers of gloves over their ordinary clothing.”255  The liberal and 
remedial purposes of the FLSA suggest that Section 203(o) should be 
construed to exclude activities that “clearly go beyond mere ‘clothes 
changing’ and involve such unusual, extraordinary things as steel-mesh 
gloves, plastic aprons, and soft and hard plastic sleeve guards.”256  These 
items are not merely for the convenience of employees, but protect them 
and consumers from death or serious harm. 
As the Secretary of Labor noted in a 2010 Opinion Letter, the type 
of clothing contemplated when Section 203(o) was enacted does not 
resemble the kind or quantity of equipment used in today’s workforce.257  
The example presented by Senator Herter, who introduced Section 
203(o), involved clothing worn by bakers, not the complex, heavy, and 
                                                                                                                                     
 254 Fox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. CV-99-BE-1612-M, 2002 WL 32987224, at *6 
(N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2002). 
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cumbersome pieces of safety gear worn today.258  A plant manager at 
Tyson Food, Inc. reported that each employee wears $400 worth of 
safety equipment, and a plant guide at IBP, Inc. stated that a worker may 
wear as much as $600 worth of safety equipment, including face masks, 
hardhats, earplugs, cloth and steel mesh gloves, mail aprons and 
leggings, weight-lifting belts, and shin guards. 259  Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
interpreted “clothing” under Section 203(o) correctly by distinguishing 
regular clothing from safety gear, which encompasses items worn to 
protect against workplace hazards.260 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the PPA, and DOL regulations make 
several legal distinctions between safety gear and clothing.  The Supreme 
Court, in Steiner, recognized the distinction between normal clothes-
changing and items used for protection against workplace hazards.261  
The Court recognized that it was not dealing with clothes changing and 
washing under normal conditions, especially because the Government 
had conceded that normal conditions would constitute either a 
“preliminary” or “postliminary” activity.262  Within the federal circuits, 
time spent donning and doffing regular clothing and standard uniforms, 
such as police or postal worker uniforms, has not been considered a 
principal activity under the PPA.263  Furthermore, the DOL regulations 
acknowledge the distinction between these two types of activities.264  
“[I]f changing clothes is merely a convenience to the employee and not 
directly related to his principal activities, it would be considered . . . a 
‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ activity rather than a principal part of the 
activity.”265  Thus, the donning and doffing of safety gear is considered a 
principal activity under the FLSA, and normal clothes-changing, which 
is not integral and indispensable, can be subject to bargaining under 
Section 203(o). 
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3. CBAs Not Requiring Compensation for Donning and Doffing 
of Required Safety Gear are in Conflict with the FLSA and the 
PPA. 
i. The PPA Requires Compensation, Regardless of Contract, 
Custom, or Practice. 
Section 203(o) allows time spent changing clothes and washing at 
the beginning and end of each workday to be excluded from hours 
worked through the process of collective bargaining.266  This provision 
has created confusion among the courts because the donning and doffing 
of clothing can be a principal, preliminary, or postliminary activity under 
the FLSA, and because the meaning of “clothing” within the statute has 
been interpreted differently.267  Yet, since the passage of the PPA, the 
majority of circuit courts have construed “principal activity” broadly, as 
intended by Congress, and found that the donning and doffing of safety 
gear is work.268  The Supreme Court’s decisions in Steiner and IBP, Inc. 
v. Alvarez provide strong support for the proposition that donning and 
doffing required safety gear is a principal activity.269  Thus, it is largely 
unanimous that the time spent donning and doffing required safety gear 
is a principal activity, and, therefore, such time is compensable.270 
Principal activities contribute to hours worked each day. 271  If 
principal activities could be bargained away, such bargaining would 
directly conflict with the FLSA, which prohibits employers from 
lengthening the workweek.272  The FLSA Savings Clause permits both 
federal and state law to set higher minimum wages and shorter periods of 
time before overtime begins, but it does not allow employers to set lower 
minimum wages or longer workweeks without overtime pay.273  The 
FLSA Savings Clause provides that “[n]o provision of this chapter shall . 
. . justify any employer in increasing hours of employment maintained by 
him which are shorter than the maximum hours applicable under this 
                                                                                                                                     
 266 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006). 
 267 See 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) (1970). 
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chapter.”274  Therefore, CBAs that extend the maximum workweek, like 
those excluding compensation for principal activities, directly conflict 
with the FLSA and must yield to it. 
Congress made clear that the PPA would compensate work 
regardless of contract, custom, or practice and that principal activities 
were meant to be broadly interpreted under the Act.275  Additionally, 
Congress approved of the DOL’s regulations explaining the PPA and 
articulating Congress’s intent.276  It is, therefore, unlikely that just two 
years later, Congress would allow parties to bargain away principal 
activities under Section 203(o), which amended the PPA.  Congress, 
after all, rejected the original House bill, which provided that any activity 
could be bargained away.277  By limiting the scope of Section 203(o) to 
clothes-changing at the beginning and end of each day, Congress 
demonstrated that it was unwilling to allow parties to bargain over 
activities that may be considered work.  Senator Herter’s example of 
bakers’ clothes-changing is more akin to regular work clothing, which is 
not considered a principal activity by the courts today.278  Thus, 
permitting collective bargaining over time spent performing activities 
that are “preliminary” or “postliminary” under the PPA best comports 
with the purposes and determinations of work under the FLSA.279 
ii. Section 203(o) Is an Exemption that Should Be Construed 
Narrowly 
The Supreme Court is clear: exemptions under the FLSA “are to be 
narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them . . . .”280  
Exemptions are limited to those “plainly and unmistakably within their 
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terms and spirit.”281  The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 203(f) 
as an exemption and has referred to Section 203(o) as an exception.282  
The Third Circuit has interpreted Section 203(i) as an exception, and the 
Ninth Circuit has held that Section 203(o) is an exemption.283 
Finding, however, that “clothing” encompasses safety equipment, 
many circuits assert that Section 203(o) should be interpreted 
expansively.284  These circuits reason that Congress did not expressly 
designate Section 203(o) as an exemption, and the plain language of the 
statute provides no indication of narrow interpretation.285  These circuits, 
however, fail to consider how the PPA and its reinforcement, Section 
203(o), fit within the FLSA.  Both the PPA and Section 203(o) were 
added to the FLSA with the express purpose of excluding certain 
activities from the FLSA’s coverage.286  They are not included within 
Section 213 of the FLSA because they do not fall within the same 
category of exemptions.287  Section 213 exemptions exclude whole 
categories of employees, whereas Section 203(o) and other FLSA 
provisions exclude certain types of activities.288  The circuits’ arguments 
also run counter to the legislative history of the PPA, which intended for 
“principal activities” to be broadly interpreted and for “preliminary” and 
“postliminary” activities to have limited application.289  Thus, Section 
203(o) should be construed narrowly, which would limit its coverage to 
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fair labor standards.  The [PPA] contemplates that employers will be relieved, in certain 
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under the [FLSA].”). 
 287 See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2004). 
 288 See id. 
 289 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
2012] And You Don’t Get Paid for That 75 
activities which “clearly and unmistakably” fit within its purview.290  
Under this narrow construction, “clothing” would not include safety 
gear. 
4. Requiring Compensation for Time Spent Donning and Doffing 
Required Safety Gear Will Improve Working Conditions 
The FLSA’s purpose is to address detrimental working conditions 
by ensuring a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.291  As evidenced by the 
numerous reports and lawsuits, current working conditions are 
approaching the detrimental conditions that existed when the FLSA was 
promulgated seventy-four years ago.292  With low levels of union 
membership and an under-protective labor law regime, unions struggle to 
effectively organize and make significant improvements to abusive 
conditions in the industry.  Even if a union was capable of forcing a few 
employers to improve working conditions, these employers would not be 
able to compete and would be driven out of business before the 
remaining employers were unionized.293  Therefore, solutions that 
improve baseline working conditions on a national- or industry-wide 
scale are essential.  Requiring employers to pay union employees for 
time spent donning and doffing required safety gear is one step toward 
improving the abusive work conditions in the meat and poultry 
processing industry. 
5. “Custom or Practice” Under Section 203(o) Codifies Industry 
Custom 
Meat and poultry processing employees have historically been paid 
using a “gang time” model, meaning employees only get paid for time 
actually spent processing poultry or meat on the production line.294  
Thus, a history of nonpayment for donning and doffing is prevalent in 
the industry.  In enacting the FLSA and the PPA, Congress did not intend 
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to perpetuate industry custom. 295  Rather, Congress intended for 
employees to be paid for all work performed, including the time spent 
donning and doffing safety gear. 
While introducing Section 203(o), Senator Herter pointed to his 
bakery example and noted that the issue under the CBA—payment 
versus nonpayment of time spent changing clothes—was “carefully 
threshed out between the employer and the employee . . . .”296  However, 
where there have been no negotiations over payment of donning and 
doffing time, there cannot be a careful threshing out of CBA terms.  
Thus, a history of nonpayment alone cannot represent a careful threshing 
out of the terms. 
Nevertheless, the majority of circuits have found that a custom or 
practice exists under Section 203(o) when there is a period of prolonged 
acquiescence.297  The circuits’ interpretation of “custom or practice” 
under Section 203(o) —one based purely on a history of nonpayment—
puts employers at an advantage and codifies industry custom.  It does not 
represent a careful threshing out of terms as Senator Herter 
recommended when he introduced the section. 
In determining the presence of custom or practice, a more just result 
would occur if parties were required to show there had been negotiation 
over the matter in dispute.  Such negotiation would demonstrate that 
actual bargaining had occurred and would not result in codification of 
industry practice.  The test used by some district courts is more in line 
with congressional intent.  These district courts require a prolonged 
period of nonpayment and knowing acquiescence.298 
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B. Section 203(o) and the LMRA Do Not Preempt State Laws 
Requiring Compensation for Time Spent Donning and Doffing 
1. Section 203(o) Does Not Preempt More Protective State Laws 
The Savings Clause of the FLSA permits federal law, state law, and 
municipal ordinances to establish a higher minimum wage or shorter 
workweek than the FLSA requires.299  The Savings Clause also states 
that no employer can interfere with any federal law, state law, or 
municipal ordinance that, pursuant to the Savings Clause, has established 
a higher minimum wage or shorter workweek.300  Since Section 203(o) is 
part of the FLSA and is not limited by the Savings Clause, states may 
define “hours worked” more broadly by requiring time spent donning 
and doffing safety gear to be compensated, and employers cannot 
compensate employees, union or non-union, below this level. 
All federal court decisions discussing the issue, including a federal 
appellate court decision, have concluded that Section 203(o) does not 
preempt more protective state laws.301  The Seventh Circuit in Spoerle 
found that Section 203(o) did not preempt a more protective Wisconsin 
state law.302  The court observed that since a more protective state law 
would trump the CBA with respect to minimum wage, a CBA calling for 
a longer workweek than state law required would also be trumped.303 
Practitioners arguing in favor of preemption often fail to discuss the 
implication of the FLSA Savings Clause, which provides that the FLSA 
creates a national floor for labor standards, not uniformity.  This is a 
significant flaw in practitioners’ analysis because the argument would 
not necessarily end there.  Even if Section 203(o) does not preempt state 
law, state law may still be preempted by the LMRA.304  Further, as the 
Seventh Circuit in Spoerle explained, the FLSA Savings Clause 
explicitly allows states to promulgate laws shortening the workweek and 
does not permit employers to oppose this. 
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Practitioners also argue that deference to a CBA better conforms 
with the FLSA’s purpose, which is to protect workers.  But employees’ 
interests are not necessarily best protected by a CBA.  Although union 
workers may obtain more benefits than nonunion workers, unionization 
is not necessarily the best means of providing baseline protection for 
workers or improving work conditions, especially considering the current 
number of challenges facing unions.305  Furthermore, bargaining over 
compensation for time spent donning and doffing frequently does not 
occur, and the circuits’ interpretation of Section 203(o) favors employers 
under these circumstances.306  Broader measures, like the FLSA, which 
provides a minimum level of protection, and more protective state laws, 
which may provide a living wage,307 are more effective in protecting 
workers, especially when enforcement of such laws is adequate. 
2. The LMRA Does Not Preempt More Protective State Laws 
State courts are not permitted to use state law to interpret CBAs; 
however, states can set the level at which bargaining begins by 
establishing a higher minimum wage or a shorter workweek.308  The 
FLSA creates minimum labor standards for CBAs, and the Supreme 
Court has found that a minimum wage and maximum workweek are 
rights that cannot be waived by contract because doing so “would 
‘nullify the purposes’ of the [FLSA] and thwart the legislative policies it 
was designed to effectuate.”309  The Supreme Court has also found that 
certain benefits required by state law, such as minimum mental health 
benefits for employees with health insurance and severance pay, cannot 
be bargained away.310  In Spoerle, the Seventh Circuit held that a 
Wisconsin law requiring compensation for time spent donning and 
doffing safety gear was not preempted by the LMRA.311   Judge 
Easterbrook premised his decision on Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic 
Chef, Inc., which had found that state laws disregarding, rather than 
interpreting, CBAs were not preempted by federal labor policy.312 
In Lingle, a unanimous Supreme Court held that “an application of 
state law is preempted by [the LMRA] only if such application requires 
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the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.”313  In Lingle, an 
employee was injured at work and filed an Illinois worker’s 
compensation claim to cover her medical expenses; her employer 
subsequently fired her for allegedly filing a false claim.314  Although the 
CBA in question provided the employee with a broad contractual remedy 
for wrongful discharge, the employee was permitted to bring a lawsuit 
under a state law prohibiting retaliatory discharge.315  This was because 
“the employee’s claim [was] based on rights arising out of a statute 
designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual 
workers.”316  Not every dispute involving a CBA provision will be 
preempted.317  State law claims may require courts to look to a CBA to 
determine appropriate damages, such as rate of pay and other benefits, 
but this does not render the claim preempted.318 
Only the Seventh Circuit has ruled on this issue with respect to 
Section 203(o).  Whereas all of the district courts that have ruled on the 
issue agree with Spoerle that state laws are not preempted by Section 
203(o), some district courts have found that the LMRA preempts state 
laws requiring compensation for time spent donning and doffing safety 
gear.319  Practitioners representing employers support these district court 
decisions and have argued in favor of preemption.320  Accordingly, these 
arguments will be addressed below. 
i. District Court Decisions Finding Preemption Under the LMRA 
Townsend’s reasoning for concluding that the LMRA preempts 
state law is representative of other district courts that have likewise ruled 
in favor of preemption.321  In making its decision, the Townsend court 
first recognized that state law rights that do not exist independently of a 
CBA, and can be waived or altered by agreement, are preempted.322  The 
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court subsequently posited that interpretation is required to determine 
whether a contract grants implied or express rights.323  The court stated 
that “when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent 
upon analysis of the terms” of a CBA, that claim must be preempted.324  
The court recognized that Lingle had held that a state law claim 
addressing the same set of facts as a claim under the CBA was not 
preempted because it did not require interpretation of the CBA.325  The 
court also observed that, in Livadas, the Supreme Court had examined a 
CBA in order to ascertain a wage rate necessary to resolve the plaintiff’s 
state law claim.326  The court in Townsend, however, did not find the 
facts of its case analogous to those in Livadas and, instead, cited two 
Third Circuit decisions decided prior to Livadas, which had found that 
employees were not entitled to back wages or overtime pay because the 
CBA’s terms required interpretation.327 
As discussed above, a state can provide minimum labor rights for 
individual employees, whether or not those employees are covered by a 
CBA.328  The FLSA specifically allows states to shorten the workweek 
and increase the minimum wage.  The Supreme Court has ruled that 
courts can look to a CBA to resolve state law claims that are independent 
of a CBA as well as matters covered by both state law and the CBA.  The 
meaning of the CBA, however, cannot be the subject of the dispute.329  
Further, the Supreme Court has found that an employee should not be 
forced to choose between a right guaranteed by state law and collective 
bargaining.330 
Townsend did not correctly apply Supreme Court precedent set 
forth in Livadas or Lingle.  There was no issue with respect to whether 
the right in Townsend was independent from the CBA.  Compensation 
for time spent donning and doffing safety gear was required by 
Pennsylvania state law and shortened the workweek, which is explicitly 
permitted by the FLSA Savings Clause.  This right was created by the 
state and independent from any applicable CBA. 
It appears that Townsend confused the calculation of damages with 
interpretation of a CBA when it claimed that resolving the issue would 
require CBA interpretation.  Indeed, there was no dispute over the 
meaning of the contract, which afforded employees twelve minutes per 
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week for donning and doffing.331  The court needed only to look at the 
CBA’s explicit terms in order to calculate the amount owed to employees 
for time spent donning and doffing safety gear.  No interpretation was 
required, as the circumstances were no different than those in Livadas or 
Lingle, where the Supreme Court had looked to the CBAs at issue to 
calculate damages for violations of state law claims.  The facts in 
Townsend are also analogous to the scenario described in Spoerle, where 
the Seventh Circuit looked to a CBA to calculate damages because, 
under the contract, the employee was paid less than the state minimum 
wage.  Thus, the state law claim in Townsend should not have been 
preempted, and the CBA should have been disregarded to the extent it 
did not comply with state law. 332 
iv. Practitioners Representing Employers 
Practitioners representing employers have asserted that courts 
should follow the reasoning set forth in In re Cargill Meat Solutions 
Wage & Hour Litigation and Townsend.333  They argue that LMRA 
“preemption occurs whenever the resolution of a claim requires a court to 
interpret the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between an 
employer and union-represented employees.”334  In addition, they assert 
that “preemption is triggered when a claim is ‘founded directly on rights 
created by collective-bargaining agreements.’”335  While recognizing that 
the NLRA is not permitted “to preempt nonnegotiable rights conferred 
on individual employees as a matter of state law,” employers argue that 
the donning and doffing of safety gear is a negotiable right because 
Congress left this type of compensation to be determined by collective 
bargaining.336  Employers contend that their right to exclude 
compensation for time spent donning and doffing is founded on a 
congressional mandate, which is later manifested in the CBA.337  Section 
203(o)’s language, according to employers, requires a court to look at the 
CBA to understand its terms.338  Accordingly, the LMRA preempts state 
law claims for donning and doffing under Section 203(o) because it 
depends upon the interpretation of a CBA.339 
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In response to practitioner contentions, states have been permitted 
to provide minimal labor rights for individual employees, even those 
employees covered by a CBA.  Thus, CBAs must yield to both federal 
and state laws that establish minimum standards such as minimum wage, 
overtime, and other benefits that are independent from a CBA.  States 
that require compensation for time spent donning and doffing protective 
equipment are exercising their right to establish a shorter maximum 
workweek for employees—a right expressly granted by the FLSA 
Savings Clause.  As established in Livadas and Lingle, under these 
circumstances, courts addressing overtime pay under state law are 
permitted to look to the CBA in order to calculate damages without being 
preempted. 
CONCLUSION 
In an extremely profitable industry, rife with abuse of workers and 
debilitating working conditions,340 the costs of doing business should not 
fall on the workers or communities where factories are located.341  When 
workers are not compensated or not compensated fairly, society is left to 
absorb the costs.342  Measures should be taken to ensure that the 
corporations that create these abusive working conditions are held 
responsible.  Enforcement of all labor laws will undoubtedly improve 
protection for workers, but, because of the egregious state of conditions, 
more is required.  Increasing employee protection under the FLSA, 
which seeks to provide a minimum standard of living for workers, will 
help provide employees with a living wage.343 
A narrow construction of Section 203(o), requiring compensation 
for the donning and doffing of safety gear, would result in improved 
working conditions for all employees, achieving the FLSA’s purpose of 
addressing detrimental working conditions through a minimum standard 
of living.344  Such interpretation would not render Section 203(o) 
meaningless because normal clothing would remain a subject of 
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bargaining.  Requiring employers to compensate employees for time 
spent donning and doffing safety gear would also be more consistent 
with Congress’s original objective, which was to have “work” construed 
liberally under the PPA and for exemptions under the FLSA to be 
construed narrowly.  Furthermore, a clear and uniform interpretation of 
Section 203(o) would result in less litigation for all parties involved. 
Even if Section 203(o) is interpreted to include safety gear, the 
FLSA Savings Clause permits states to enact more protective state laws 
with regard to minimum wages, overtime pay, and other types of 
employee benefits.  State laws requiring compensation for donning and 
doffing safety gear shorten the workweek and fall under the FLSA 
Savings Clause.  In addition, Supreme Court jurisprudence allows CBAs 
to be ignored to the extent they do not conform with state laws that create 
rights independent of a CBA.  Looking to a CBA to determine damages 
does not conflict with the LMRA.  Therefore, state laws requiring 
compensation for the donning and doffing of safety gear are independent 
of CBAs and should not be preempted by the LMRA. 
  

